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Architects of Globalism: Building a New World Order during  
World War II (review)

Francis J. Gavin

Journal of Cold War Studies, Volume 7, Number 3, Summer 2005, pp. 167-169  
(Review)

Published by The MIT Press



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of citizenship and peace. Laville talks about how women wanted to achieve world peace, but she barely mentions the organizations whose main work was in fact peace and social justice. The reader therefore leaves the book a bit puzzled, not understanding the scope of women's peace efforts made during this time through conservative as well as liberal voluntary organizations.



Patrick J. Hearden. *Architects of Globalism: Building a New World Order during World War II*. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2002. 400 pp. \$39.95.

*Reviewed by Francis J. Gavin, University of Texas at Austin*

The thesis of Patrick Hearden's book is right in the title. His impressively researched, well-written study attempts to demonstrate how during and even before the United States entered World War II U.S. State Department officials—the “architects”—planned and implemented their economic and geopolitical vision for the postwar world. This “new world order” was to be shaped by free trade and capital movements around the globe, averting a return to the depression at home by creating markets abroad for surplus American goods. This liberal “open door” would also prevent both social revolution overseas and the reemergence of the type of authoritarian, economically autarkic regimes that these planners believed had caused World War II.

In detailed, well-organized chapters, Hearden reveals how U.S. officials wrestled with enormously complicated questions as they planned to realize their globalist vision. Should Germany be destroyed and permanently deindustrialized, or should it be rebuilt and peacefully reintegrated into a democratic, market-oriented Europe? What should be done in the turbulent Middle East, where valuable oil reserves were complicating the already messy dynamic of post-Ottoman religious and political turmoil? Could East Asia be stabilized so that Japan and China coexisted while opening their valuable markets to U.S. trade and investment? Could the United States successfully build international organizations that would ensure security and guarantee a liberal world trading order? What would be the relationship between the big three—the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain—after the conflict ended?

Hearden is at his best when detailing the well-known battles both within the State Department and between the department and the rest of the U.S. government to move postwar planning in a globalist direction. He has exhaustively mined a wide range of both private and governmental papers in the United States to tell how these planners set out to build their market-oriented new world order to America's economic advantage. His narrative is full of useful information, but his arguments and methodology are not without flaws.

First, there are obvious limits to what planning can tell us, and Hearden often conflates the architects' vision with what actually happened. Important as postwar planning was, we know that Franklin D. Roosevelt time and time again made winning the war a higher priority. When postwar planning threatened to weaken America's

wartime alliance with Great Britain (i.e., on matters relating to decolonization or postwar trade policy) or with the Soviet Union (i.e., the political status of Poland), Roosevelt almost always chose the route that ensured the quickest defeat of Germany and Japan, regardless of the consequences for “building a new world order.” This guaranteed that regardless of what State Department officials hoped to bring about, most of the actual *policies* would not be decided until after the war was won.

Second, by focusing solely on the American side of planning, Hearden provides only a small and distorted part of the story. What were Soviet and British leaders thinking about the postwar world? What were politicians in India, Egypt, and China planning? How would the defeated powers respond? How would the dramatic changes in each country’s domestic political and social order affect U.S. officials’ attempt to enforce their “new world order”? Did U.S. policymakers even begin to understand these changes and to adapt their plans accordingly? A more international and comparative approach to these questions would have made the book much stronger.

A more fundamental problem arises with Hearden’s argument that U.S. planners saw World War II as an opportunity to reshape the globe to reflect American values and interests, especially in the economic realm. Hearden builds on the old revisionist claim that U.S. policy was driven by the desire to create a liberal capitalist world system. The United States certainly cared about the shape of the global economic order after the war. But Hearden takes this argument to an extreme. “If Germany won a quick victory, they [U.S. leaders] feared that Hitler would close the doors of Europe against American trade and investment” (p. 10). Was that really the main fear of the Roosevelt administration? Surely these economic losses, no matter how painful, did not rank anywhere near the top of FDR’s concerns as he worried about Hitler’s march toward domination in Europe. The security threat to close allies and to the United States itself, combined with moral outrage at the Nazis’ despicable practices, trumped any worries about lost trade and investment opportunities. Hearden argues that these type of economic concerns continued to drive U.S. policy in the decades after World War II. American actions in Korea, Vietnam, and the Middle East demonstrated that U.S. policymakers “were prepared to employ military force, if necessary, to keep foreign markets open for American products and thereby assure the survival of free enterprise in the United States” (p. 319). This vast oversimplification of American motives during both World War II and the Cold War is a caricature of U.S. policy.

In fact, much evidence exists that security and geopolitical concerns drove U.S. policy far more than economic issues both during and after World War II. Consider how differently the United States treated Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Both wartime allies fiercely resisted U.S. attempts to force them to embrace open-door economics. Time and time again, as Hearden chronicles, Great Britain refused to decolonize rapidly and failed to carry out its promises to end trade preferences and currency restrictions, much to the dismay of State Department officials. If economic interests truly drove U.S. policy, why did U.S. relations with Great Britain not worsen? The Anglo-American political relationship hardly suffered at all, despite London’s stubborn refusal to embrace American-style economic priorities. Regardless of Britain’s do-

mestic or even international economic policies, the country was a *strategic* ally of the United States, whereas the Soviet Union was a geopolitical and ideological adversary after the war.

Hearden's determination to prove the revisionist thesis limits the value of his study in other places. Many scholars, including prominent revisionists, would dispute Hearden's claim that the "foreign policy of the United States did not undergo any fundamental change when Roosevelt died and [Harry] Truman moved into the White House" (p. 314). It is hard to square the statement that in 1933 "Roosevelt shared" the State Department's "internationalist outlook" if we bear in mind the president's effort to sabotage the London Economic Conference, a meeting called to halt the world's descent into economic nationalism. Hearden also seems unaware of the decades-old work of Marc Trachtenberg, Stephen Schuker, and Walter McDougall on the reparations question and Germany. It was the British, not the French, who inflated the reparations numbers, and, contrary to Hearden's assertions, Woodrow Wilson did little to stop them. Furthermore, the reparations issue revolved around a political question—the willingness of Germany to pay—as opposed to a purely economic question, the *capacity* to pay. Finally, the link between economic depression and war is not clear-cut. Both the United States and the Soviet Union faced tremendous economic pressures in the 1930s. But instead of expanding, both giants turned inward and isolationist, with dangerous results.

Most important, the new world order that emerged after World War II bore little resemblance to the vision espoused by the American "architects." The British failed in their attempts to make sterling convertible and maintained many of their imperial preferences. Japan and West Germany reemerged as economic powers behind protectionist trade barriers and monetary controls. With U.S. encouragement, the European Economic Community was built explicitly to discriminate *against* American goods. In many ways, the postwar order was far less "globalist" than the international environment of the 1920s or the decades preceding World War I. Hearden provides an excellent insight into the debates within the U.S. government regarding plans for a "new world order," but he is far less convincing in showing the actual implementation.



Robert Dallek, *An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917–1963*. Boston: Little, Brown, 2003. 838 pp. \$30.00.

*Reviewed by Fred I. Greenstein, Princeton University*

John F. Kennedy would stand high on any ranking of political leaders whose personal qualities helped shape the Cold War. His finger was on the American nuclear button during the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, a confrontation that could have destroyed hundreds of millions of lives and could have eroded the habitability of most of the planet. Kennedy's advisers were sharply divided about whether to give Soviet lead-